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Abstract
The  dimension  of  the  debate  on  the  relation  between  the  universal  and  the
particular in African philosophy has been skewed in favour of the universalists
who argued that  the condition  for  the  possibility  of  an  African  conception  of
philosophy cannot be achieved outside the “universal’ idea of the philosophical
enterprise. In this sense, the ethnophilosophical project and its attempt to rescue
the  idea  of  an  African  past  necessary  for  the  reconstruction  of  an  African
postcolonial  identity  and  development  becomes  a  futile  one.  A  recent
commentator even argues that works concerning African identity are now totally
irrelevant and misguided. In this essay, I will be arguing, on the contrary, that the
universalist’s  argument,  much  like  its  critique  of  ethnophilosophical  reason,
mistakes the nature, significance and necessity of such a  resistance (rather than
original) identity that the ethnophilosophical project promises. I will also argue
that the fabrication of such an identity facilitates the avoidance of an uncritical
submersion  in  the  universal  as  well  as  a  proper  conception  of  an  African
development.  This,  furthermore,  is  the only avenue by which the imperialistic
ontological space of universal humanism, in which most universalist claims are
rooted,  can  be  made  more  polygonal  and  mutually  beneficial  for  alternative
cultural particulars.
L’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers
(Man is born free but is everywhere in chains)
--Rousseau 
The  work  of  the  philosopher  consists  in  assembling  reminders  for
particular purpose.
--Wittgenstein
Introduction: On the Universal and the Particular
Philosophers celebrate perennial problems. One of such problems is that of universals
and their relationship to particular concrete objects. From the specifically metaphysical
altercations between the realists and the nominalists, we can abstract certain culturally
specific problematics: How does the universal category of, say, the  human appropriate
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particular cultural experiences? Or, to use a Heideggerian terminology, what does it mean
for  various  human  beings  to  be?  Consequently,  how  can  we  theorize  the  African’s
“being-in-the-world”? And, what role does the African philosophical project play in such
theorisation? 
African  philosophers’  confrontation  with  these  problems  has  been particularly
mediated by the need to specify the conditions necessary for the possibility of an African
philosophy and development. In other words, given the unique confrontation with Europe
that gave rise to the body of works we refer to as “African philosophy,” African scholars
were faced with the problem of identifying certain cores of African experiences that will
serve as the basis for deriving philosophy from a specific cultural environment. They saw
the need to differentiate the African experience from specifically Western experience and
its  influence on philosophical  speculation.  And on the basis  of this  differentiation,  to
reconstruct an African identity that will serve as the fulcrum for determining a path for
African development after colonisation.
The debate in African philosophy has been ably divided between the universalists
and  the  culturalists  (or,  in  strictly  African  philosophical  terms,  between  the
ethnophilosophers and the professional philosophers).1 The universalists contend that the
only justification for an “African” philosophy is as a particular instantiation of a universal
philosophy originating  in  the West.  On the other  hand,  the culturalists  argue that  all
philosophies are particular cultural phenomena that follow specific cultural evolutionary
pathways. 
In the controversy concerning both the proper methodology of doing this African
philosophy  and  the  means  of  achieving  an  African  identity  suitable  for  the  proper
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conception of an African development, the universalist seems to have won. However I
will be arguing that this triumph is actually pyrrhic in the sense that what the universalist
seems to have gained both methodologically and substantively,  is at the great cost of
misunderstanding the issue of an African postcolonial identity. Specifically, my argument
is that it is only an uncritical adoption of universalism in the shape of the concept of the
human that  can  warrant  its  critique  of  the  ethnophilosophical  project  central  to  the
culturalists.  The  strategy  I  will  adopt  is  to  examine  a  recent  universalist  claim  that
maligns  the necessity of an African identitarian  project  as a veritable  path towards a
beneficial conception of African development.
The universalist position is ably represented by Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu
and  Kwame  Anthony  Appiah.  According  to  Hountondji,  “By  ‘African  philosophy’  I
mean  a set  of  texts,  specifically  the  set  of  texts  written  by Africans  themselves  and
described  as  philosophical  by  their  authors  themselves.”2 This  characterisation  stems
from  his  contention  that  philosophy  itself  is  a  theoretical  discipline—like  physics,
mathematics  and  linguistics—with  a  methodological  orientation  and  some  set  of
substantive issues with which practitioners are preoccupied. Philosophy, for Hountondji,
begins when the discipline discursively begins to confront its own problematics. On this
tradition of discursiveness, he writes:
…philosophy never stops; its very existence lies in the to and fro of free
discussion, without which there is no philosophy. It is not a closed system
but  a  history,  a  debate  that  goes  on  from generation  to  generation,  in
which every thinker, every author, engages in total responsibility: I know I
am  responsible  for  what  I  say,  for  the  theories  I  put  forward….A
philosophical…work…is intelligible  only as a moment in a  debate that
sustains and transcends it. It always refers to antecedent positions, either
to refute them or to confirm and enrich them. It takes on meaning only in
relation to that history, in relation to the term of an ever-changing debate
in which the sole stable element is the constant reference to one self-same
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object,  to  one  sphere  of  experience,  the  characterization  of  which,
incidentally, is itself part of the evolution.3 
Given this explanation, authentic philosophical cogitations become textual, while
orature (fables, dynastic poems, epics, proverbs, myths, and so on) pales as only a pre-
text of  the  tradition  of  discursivity  peculiar  to  a  universal  philosophy.  Hountondji’s
absolutism  about  the  theoretical  circumference  of  autonomous  philosophy  therefore
excludes the ethnophilosophers’ conception of philosophy as primarily a cultural field
preoccupied with the analysis of oral literature and other items of the preliterate culture.
The theoretical move, by ethnologists, social scientists and cultural anthropologists, from
a descriptive analysis of human cultural ideas and institutions to the attempt to  study “…
beliefs and values and draws conclusions about the mode of thought that are imputed to
their  formulation  and  observance…”4 is,  for  Hountondji,  an  unjustifiable
ethnophilosophical strategy. 
Wiredu’s universalist argument is also very simple. For him, the theoretical and
critical  nature  of  philosophy  cannot  afford  the  ethnophilosophical  view  of  it  as  an
uncritical communal undertaking. The adequacy of any philosophy has nothing to do with
its origination but rather with its discursivity:  its ability to “generate theories that can
illuminate the problems of the day” and thus provide “the context of ideas within which
particular choices and preferences in the realm of action—whether economic, political,
cultural or scientific—can be made.”5 
In this sense, philosophy has a cogent relationship with science or rather with the
habits of mind characteristic of science: “habits of exactness and rigour in thinking, the
pursuit  of  systematic  coherence  and  the  experimental  approach.”6 Although  he  is
specifically clear on the culture-relativity of philosophy, he is insistent that philosophy
4
can be universal.7 Such a universal philosophy,  for instance,  would be aided by what
Wiredu calls “the fundamental biological unity of the human species.” This derives from
the fact that “there is a human way of developing in which instinctual drives are in due
course transformed into structured thought, discourse and action.” The basic essentials of
this process proceed “in similar ways among all human beings.”8 
Hountondji’s  and  Wiredu’s  universalism is  marshaled  against  the  culturalists’
position  summed  up  in  Hountondji’s  pejorative  term:  Ethnophilosophy.  The
ethnophilosophical reason is represented fundamentally by what Hountondji sees as an
attempt to postulate  unanimity in philosophical  beliefs among Africans,  and hence to
uncritically  initiate  a  confrontation  with  the  African  traditional  past.  On  this
understanding,  “critics  of  ethnophilosophy  [therefore]  argue  that  a  focus  on  the  past
detracts  from  a  critical  posture  that  evaluates  all  practices  in  terms  of  what  they
contribute  to  the  liberation  of  Africa...  for  African  philosophy  need  not  express  a
particular outlook for Africans.”9  
In “Humanistic Cultural Universalism,” Oyeshile provides a critical elaboration of
this  critique of ethnophilosophical  reason, and particularly an argument for a cultural
universalism  that  can  motivate  Africa’s  search  for  a  paradigm  of  an  authentic
postcolonial development. Though not really directed at the ethnophilosophical project in
a way that Hountondji’s and Wiredu’s critiques were, his critical analysis also negates
ethnophilosophy and especially its search for an African postcolonial identity. His basic
argument in the essay is that “African development should only be sought in universalist
terms which should involve certain humanistic values.” For this reason, therefore, “most
works  concerning  African  identity  are  now  irrelevant,  and  if  they  are  not,  they  are
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misguided.”  The urgent  task in  Africa  and of  the  African  scholars  is,  in  this  regard,
“human  development  in  all  its  ramifications  and  not  the  assertion  of  the  African
personality (identity) which was more relevant at a particular period in our history.”10 
Oyeshile’s two claims are that (a) a humanistic cultural universalism provides a
veritable starting point for launching the project of an African development, and (b) this
universalism  excludes a  search  for  a  cultural  identity  from the  vantage  point  of  the
African.  In  his  own  admission,  Oyeshile’s  argument  draws  largely  from  Appiah’s
universalist  conception  of  African  philosophy  and  his  critique  of  African  cultural
nationalism (read: ethnophilosophy). Appiah’s universalism is based on the contention
that cultural nationalism in its pan-African guise is really a racial construct created by
Europe as a subjugating strategy.  As such, it assumes a cultural or racial  unity of the
African and African diasporic people. However, according to Appiah, since the biological
and cultural arguments for races failed to establish their existence, then Pan Africanism
fails  also  for  that  reason.  Its  vision  of  a  completely  different  or  a  completely
homogeneous Africa in dialectical opposition to the West is also false. 
This is the fulcrum of Appiah’s thesis. If it is correct,  for him (as well as for
Hountondji), to argue that Africa really does not have a common traditional culture, a
common language, a common religion, or even belong to a common race, then a case can
be made for the alignment of Africa to the universe of humanity.11 The first part of this
case  is  that  Africa,  apart  from  being  a  geographical  entity  accommodating  diverse
peoples and cultures, “shares too many problems and projects to be distracted by a bogus
basis  for  solidarity.”  These  problems  include  those  that  every  modernising  region  is
facing  in  a  rapidly  globalising  world:  common  ecological  problems;  a  situation  of
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dependency;  the  problem of  racism;  the  possibilities  of  the  development  of  regional
markets and local circuits of production; and so on.12 Thus, since we as Africans are now
confronted  with  a  new  self more  individualistic  and  atomic  than  the  self  of  the
precapitalist societies, then its inescapability becomes something to celebrate. Within this
modern society therefore, what exists is not the cult of difference or race but rather the
solidarity of humanity.
The second part of Appiah’s case is that, like every other universalists, he also
deploys arguments for an autonomous philosophy with a substantive concern for certain
fundamental problems. These problems—causation,  good and evil,  mind-body, justice,
illusion, reason, reality, truth, etc—may really appear Western but are actually universal
in  scope.  While  these problems may be seen as constituting the core of the Western
philosophical tradition, Appiah contends that they can as well be seen “as growing out of
a history of systematic reflection on widespread, prereflective beliefs about the nature of
humankind, about the purposes, and about our knowledge of and place in the cosmos.”13
Something therefore counts as philosophy if it confronts these issues critically with the
required  “traditional  philosophical  method.”  (We  therefore  arrive  at  the  logic  of
Hountondji’s  definition  of  African  philosophy.)  For  Appiah,  it  would  be  extremely
difficult to conceive of a  human culture where nothing like these fundamental issues is
present or that does not have “any crucial organizing concepts.” 
Essentially therefore, for Appiah, 
We [Africans] will solve our problems if we see them as human problems
arising out of a special situation, and we shall not solve them if we see
them  as  African  problems,  generated  by  our  being  somehow  unlike
others… If  there  is  a  lesson  in  the  broad  shape  of  this  circulation  of
cultures, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each other,
that there is no longer fully autochthonous  echt-African culture awaiting
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salvage by our  artists  (just  as there is,  of course,  no American  culture
without African roots).14 
Africans must, in other words, jettison the illusion of a unique African identity in a global
world  that  is  not  only  interdependent  but  also  rapidly  integrating.  Furthermore,  the
project  of  an  African  development  becomes  realisable  within  this  humanistic
universalism that ensures cultural interrelationship rather than insularity. 
 It seems quite obvious how Oyeshile could arrive at his argument of a humanistic
universalism unburdened by the unnecessary encumbrances of cultural nationalism and
its identity illusion. Following Appiah, the two horns of his contention becomes clearer.
On the one hand, the issue of African identity was relevant “as a rallying point for a
people who wanted to have a belief in themselves, a people who wanted to be capable of
determining their own destiny in the face of motley values.” On the other hand, such a
reason no longer applies because “the identity issue does not address the urgent problems
confronting Africa. It lays more than enough stress on the African personality rather than
on the compelling problems of scientific development,  hunger, religious emancipation
and political anarchy.”15 
In a straightforward reflection of the overt optimism of Appiah’s universalism,
Oyeshile also remarks that
Of course, it is a truism that Africa is currently enmeshed in political and
economic problems. Solutions to these problems would go a long way to
engender development. However, these problems can only be solved if we
as Africans see ourselves as an integral part of the world order. It is then
that political rights and other political values will be respected by African
political leaders. It is also then that the goal of economic emancipation can
be pursued vigorously.16 
What  I  have  done  in  this  section  of  the  essay  is  to  lay  down  the  case  for
universalism and  the  impossibility  of  an  unnecessarily  provincial  burden  of  identity
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within its imperative. The most common denominator among the universalists is their
trenchant critique of the (African) identity issue. This is followed, especially in Appiah
and Oyeshile, by a simplistic, one-dimensional optimism in the efficacy of humanistic
values and concert as the ultimate panacea for the resolution of human problems. Though
Oyeshile does not seriously consider metaphilosophical issues in his critique, philosophy
plays a pivotal role in the construal of their humanism. In the next section, I will critically
examine  how  a  supposedly  universal  construal  of  philosophy  led  to  a  “universal”
humanism whose ethnocentric bent constrict the ontological space. It will be clear from
this that most conceptions of the universal use it as a conceptual forum for a particular
identity manifestation. 
Philosophy and the Shape of the Human
The  philosophical  enterprise,  as  we  noted  above,  is  crucial  to  the  universalists’
conception of a viable universal humanism. It is equally significant for the specification
of the conditions for an African philosophical  project oriented towards a postcolonial
African identity and development. The universalists divorce an authentic philosophical
discourse from a purely provincial need. For them, philosophy must be autonomous of all
identity issues since it promises a virile humanistic universalism. After all, philosophy,
according to the argument, is the ultimate human achievement! 
How does this idea of autonomous philosophy contribute to our formulation of the
utility of African identity  contra the universalist’s contention? As I will be showing, a
critical interrogation of these concepts (i.e. the human, the philosophical) will lead to the
particularist concepts,  theories,  canons  and  identities  which  have  been  denied  to
individual cultures in the putative necessity of universal humanism.17 
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The  foundation  of  modern  philosophy  is  supposedly  derived  from Descartes’
unique confrontation with the perennial problems of philosophy. Basically, the Cartesian
Weltanschauung differentiates between the human and the animal domain and on this
basis  claims  that  the mental  is  different  from the physical.  In short,  it  demanded the
predominance of epistemology in modern philosophy. Thus, from the presumption that
philosophy is a uniquely human phenomenon, 
Cartesians  postulate  the  absolute  autonomy  of  philosophy.  They
presuppose  that  there  is  a  distinct  set  of  philosophical  problems
independent of culture, society and history. For them, philosophy stands
outside the various conventions on which people base their social practices
and transcends the cultural heritage and political struggles of people.18 
On this account,  Hountondji,  Wiredu, Appiah and Oyeshile would be Cartesians. The
point is not really a strange one given the scientific positivism consequent upon such a
view  of  philosophy.  It  is  in  the  Cartesian  philosophical  framework,  that  is,  that  we
witness the unique coincidence of episteme and scientia. 
Yet, Descartes, a 17th century French philosopher, scientist and mathematician,
was  only  responding  to  specific  historical  circumstances  in  relation  to  the  medieval
period.  For  example,  the  rise  of  science  and  the  advent  of  the  capitalist  production.
Cornel West explores the metaphilosophical insights in Heidegger’s, Wittgenstein’s and
Dewey’s  metaphilosophical  arguments  against  the  ahistorical  character  of  Cartesian
autonomous  philosophy.  Through  his  critique  of  the  historical  hermeneutics  of
Heidegger,  the  cultural  descriptions  of  Wittgenstein  and the  pragmatic  orientation  of
Dewey, he arrives at a definition of Afro-American philosophy as “…the interpretation of
Afro-American history, highlighting the cultural heritage and political struggles, which
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provides desirable norms that should regulate responses to particular challenges presently
confronting Afro-Americans.”19   
It is a wonder that in spite of this particularist definition West goes on to explicate
a humanistic view that can guide an understanding of Afro-American culture and politics.
I will argue later why his humanism is more robust and critical than that of Oyeshile and
the others. But for now, we need to interrogate what made the Cartesian conception of
autonomous  philosophy  a  unique  ontological  strategy  for  invading  the  space  of  the
universal anthropos. I suspect that an attempt to answer a similar question would have
given Oyeshile and the universalist movement a critical outlook on “the universal.” 
In  his  discussion  of  the  utility  of  social  memory—of  preservation,  selection,
elimination  and  invention—in  the  process  of  identity  formation,  Mazrui  gives  us  an
opening into the analysis of the Western appropriation of the ontological space of the
human. This began with the arbitrary incorporation of ancient Greece into the ancestral
lineage of Euro-American cultural heritage. This, for Mazrui, is a blatant case of false
memory—inscribing into one’s past what is originally not a part of it—as well as that of
macro-plagiarism, “a massive borrowing by one civilization from another in a manner
which deliberately obscures origins and denies acknowledgement and attribution.”20 
Since philosophy as the ultimate rational enterprise is putatively the discovery of
the Greeks, the archetypal  humans (from whom Hegel’s absolute spirit began its non-
historical march towards substantive objectivity and “essential universality” culminating
in  Euro-American  cultures),  the  Cartesian  autonomous  philosophy  is  thereby
complemented by an ahistorical conception of humanism as “something essential, above
and beyond the accidents of historical or national difference.”21 
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The history of the signification of the “human” is certainly one that bears out what
a commentator has described as the Humpty Dumbtean conclusion that the meaning of
humanism belongs to politics rather than to semantics. Politics, that is, speaks to the issue
of which, among all the available meanings, is to be master. According to Davies, 
For the meanings of a powerful and complex word are never a matter for
lexicography alone. They are tied inescapably to the linguistic and cultural
authority,  real,  absent  or  desired,  of  those  who  use  it.  The  important
question, over and above what the word means in a particular context, is
why and how that meaning matters, and for whom.22 
A  panoramic  view  of  all  perspectives  on  the  concept—civic  humanism,  Protestant
humanism,  rationalistic  humanism,  romantic  humanism,  positivistic  humanism,  liberal
humanism,  Nazi  humanism,  Heidegger’s  antihumanist  humanism,  and  the  humanist
antihumanism of Foucault  and Althusser—reveals that they have been imperial,  “they
speak of the human in the accents and interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. Their embrace
suffocates those whom it does not ignore.”23 
This exclusionary as well as smothering element is what Symonds traced from the
discovery of romantic humanism to the dawn of modernity in Europe. For him, 
The essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of the
dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations,
and in the further perception that classic literature alone displayed human
nature in the plenitude of intellectual and moral freedom… The study of
Greek opened up philosophical horizons far beyond the dream-world of
the  churchmen  and  the  monks;  it  stimulated  the  germs  of  science,
suggested  new  astronomical  hypotheses,  and  indirectly  led  to  the
discovery of America…24 
We  seem  to  have,  on  Symonds’  testimonies,  imperial  colonisation  flowing  from  a
romantic conception of the human! We therefore arrive at the triumph of the Arnoldian
“central, truly human point of view”: essential, above and beyond historical or national
differences. 
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We must wonder, as Davies does and most of the universalists do not, about the
accent placed on “central,” “truly human” and “human.” The implication seems to be that
every appeal to an abstract  and essential  humanism is an appropriation of at worse a
suffocating, and at best a discompassing perspective that perpetuates the domination of
those who are perceived to be inauthentically human. Thus,
Each of us lives our human-ness as a uniquely individual experience; but
that  experience,  we are asked to feel,  is part  of a larger,  all-embracing
humanity, a “human condition”, to which the great poets of the European
tradition,  Homer and Dante and Chaucer and Shakespeare and Milton
and Goethe, can give us the key.25 
However, given this protean adaptability of the term, it would only be logical to
explore  its  nebulous  boundaries  and  depths  from  a  particular  human  perspective.
Oyeshile is not cautious enough to investigate the specific historical and local interests
that may be at work within such a grand concept. This is necessary because universalism
is meant to dissolve such particularities like race, sex, class, culture from which most
people experience human-ness. According to Davies, “humanism” is an anachronism that
is still deeply embedded in contemporary consciousness and everyday common sense
to  the  extent  that  it  requires  a  conscious  effort,  every  time  someone
appeals to “human nature” or “the human condition”, to recall how recent
such notions  are,  and how specific  to  a  particular  history and point  of
view,  and  how  very  odd  it  would  seem,  in  cultures  historically  or
ethnologically unlike our own, to separate out and privilege “Man” in this
way.26 
This cultural appropriation of the anthropos is followed by a denial of an African
influence not only on the Greek cultural heritage, but on world history as a whole. In
other words, there is an ontological attempt to efface black, African identity from the
template of a supposed universal culture. Gordon theorises this as the ontological attempt
at the phenomenological invisibility or disappearance of Africans and Afro-Americans.
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The existential-phenomenological approach of Gordon theorises the interactive dynamics
of the ontologies of white and black ego-genesis and the resultant “imperial battles for
ontological  space”  (as  a  space  of  self-positing  and  its  realisation).  These  battles  are
imperial  because  Euro-Americans  have  defined  the  ontological  space  of  white  ego-
genesis in such a way that makes it possible to evade the humanity of Africans.27    
In his account of bad faith, Gordon argues that since human beings generally deal
inauthentically with the specific—political, economic, racial or, for Gordon and Sartre,
ontological—hindrances  between  self-positing  and  self-realisation,  it  implies  that  the
self’s project of being always falls short of its projected ideal. However, in bad faith, we
pretend to a greater degree of self-integration than our ego has in fact achieved. This
pretense must however be concealed through certain evasive or compensatory existential
activity of exploitation. For the white, this manifests through an acute racial stereotyping,
a “projective non-seeing” that performs “the phenomenological disappearance” of black
humanity.28 This constitutive act of absence, invisibility, displacement and anonymity is
…fundamentally phenomenological, that is an absence that is constituted
as a meaning in the white consciousness. This spell of phenomenological
invisibility  is  an  important  contribution  of  the  European  and  Euro-
American philosophical consciousness to the larger encompassing cloud
of non-seeing conjured by European imperialism to veil the humanity of
Africans.29 
The result is that the formation of the white ego is simultaneously the deformation of the
black ego. Paradoxically, however, in denying “the forces of civilizational origins” and in
the effacement of African humanity,  it becomes quite obvious that the Euro-American
cultural establishment unwittingly undermines its quest for the universal.30 
Thus,  if  a people’s  humanity is  seriously interrogated as the Africans’ was in
colonialism,  then  why  should  it  not  be  logical  to  question  the  putative  universal
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humanism? That is,  if they have been ontologically effaced from the  anthropos, what
possible means could they have of participating in it? It must therefore become obvious
why it is really awkward to claim, as Oyeshile does, that the issue of self-identity of the
Africans was only useful at  a point  in their  cultural  development.  On the contrary,  a
culture’s dynamic relation with others is, inter alia, a constant reevaluation of its identity
and esteem, “the act of self-definition forever remains open-ended, with no guarantee of
triumph. Indeed, the process takes precedent over the result, since any static self-identity
soon  disintegrates  the  self.”31 And  since  the  ontologically  invisible  Africans  would
always  experience  Europe  and  America  as  the  questioning  of  their  very  existence,
Oyeshile would definitely be wrong to claim that any attempt to reclaim that identity is
irrelevant or misguided. 
It becomes unimaginative to formulate the counter-thesis that it is the problem of
identity rather than that of development that is primary for Africans. Without the former,
the latter is meaningless. What then makes this reclamation possible?
African Experience and the Constitution of Modernity
Friedrich Nietzsche, the ancestor for many dimensions of antihumanism, has argued, in
Human All Too Human, that 
All  philosophers involuntarily think of “man” as an  aeterna veritas,  as
something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure
of  things…Lack  of  historical  sense  is  the  family  failing  of  all
philosophers; many, without being aware of it, even take the most recent
manifestation  of  man,  such  as  has  risen  under  the  impress  of  certain
religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one
has to start out…32 
What does a “historical sense” require in the attempt to ensure the phenomenological
visibility of the Africans in the ontological struggles for relevance? Gordon argues that
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the question of existence is, in itself, an empty one; it is always a conjunctive affair. In
other words, the question must always be situated in the existential realities of theorising
blackness and the African. According to him,
At the heart of existential thought are two questions; “What are we”? and
“What shall we do?” these questions can be translated into questions of
identity and normative action. They are questions, further, of ontological
and teleological significance, for the former addresses being and the latter
addresses what to become—in a word, “purpose.”33 
Since the elements of African cultural identity have been undergoing significant
changes  in  response  to  their  confrontation  with  European  imperialism and  American
racism, it would seem necessary to reformulate a new context for the confrontation with
the questions of identity and normative action. I suspect that Oyeshile and most of the
universalists mistook the need for such a “resistance identity” for the attempt to glorify a
“mystique of  pure  coherence”  that  is  usually  associated  with  the  ethnophilosophers’
perception of the traditional African past. 
In constructing such a resistance identity, some kind of reinvention would serve
the Africans well. Many African scholars, including Appiah, see the need for such an
imagined locus  of  solidarity.  Like  Appiah,  Mazrui  argues  that  “Real  Pan-Africanism
must go beyond the twin stimuli of poetry and imperialism. Pan-Africanism is based on a
positive  false  memory—that  Africa  was  divided  by  colonialism  and  was  previously
one.”34 This  project  of  reclamation  radically  confronts  the  necessity  of  an
ethnophilosophical  examination  of  the  African  cultural  past  beyond  any  romantic
idealisation. Henry gives two reasons for the necessity of a phenomenological analysis of
African traditional heritage. 
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One,  through  a  Shutzian  (reference  to  Alfred  Shutz,  the  phenomenologist)
proprietary relationship, African philosophers have a significant tie with these cultural
constructs  as  invaluable  properties  in  a  way  such  that  “expectation,  (particularly  of
continuity),  obligations  and  constraints  are  imposed  upon  us.  This  legacy  is  our
responsibility in ways that cannot be for non-African groups.” We are therefore saddled
with  the  responsibility  of  preserving  and  developing  “this  heritage  by  examining  it
ethnophilosophically,  by reflecting on it in [our] own lived experience,  or collectively
with contemporaries and consociates.” Two, Henry further contends that this proprietary
relation with the symbols and discourses of traditional Africa is extended to a unique ego-
genetic relation with the predecessors in such a way that the relations “establish certain
common  cultural  or  mythopoetic  elements  in  the  formation  of  African,  African-
American, and African-Caribbean egos.”35 This formative role of the cultural elements
will  constitute  them  as  common  elements  that  will  facilitate  the  self-reflection  of
African/a philosophers on their own ego-genetic processes, and on the cultural identity of
an African/a philosophy. 
After immersing ourselves in historical thinking, a bit of Nietzschean modesty is
in order. This is because Nietzsche holds that the “virtue of modesty” is required for
historical  philosophising.  This  takes  many  dimensions.  The  first  is  that  after  the
ontological determination of the self-identity of Africans and African philosophy, African
philosophers  must  go  on  to  confront  the  socio-existential  dimension  of  the  African
predicament  that  bears  directly  on  the  problems  of  African  development.  This  is
generally the problem of how African cultures can be modern. This, after all, is the basis
for the universalism of Appiah, Hountondji, Wiredu and lately Oyeshile. 
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However, as the preceding arguments have revealed, modernity is originally and
incredibly  constituted  as  a  western—Euro-American—phenomenon  together  with  its
exclusionary ontology. West rightly defines modernity as 
the  descriptive  notion  that  connotes  the  historical  state  of  affairs
characterized by an abundance of wealth resulting from the industrial and
technological  revolution  and  the  ensuing  cultural  isolation  and
fragmentation due to a disintegration of closely-knit communities and the
decline of religious systems.36 
The  question  of  how  African  can  become  modern  is  only  meaningful  from  the
background  of  the  rescue  of  African  cultural  visibility  from the  anonymity  of  Euro-
American  philosophical  and  cultural  imperialism and  humanism.  A  regained  cultural
distinctiveness provides a strong arsenal for meeting a modernity defined by science and
technology. In other words, since the scientism of Euro-American modernity requires the
“phenomenological  disappearance”  of  myth,  tradition,  religion  and  other  supposedly
extra-scientific discourses, and since these “extras” are crucial for the authentic formation
of an African postcolonial identity or ego, then a dialectical relationship between the two
will be significant for the constitution of an African modernity as an important dimension
of the modernity project itself.
Africa’s  relationship  with  Euro-American  modernity  constitutes  an  ambivalent
challenge: that of participating in its achievement without simultaneously surrendering to
its  ethnocentric  underpinnings.  Here,  we  achieve  our  second  point  of  Nietzschean
modesty through Benhabib. In “Cultural Complexity,” she also confronts the question of
ethnocentric discourse and global imperative: “Whence does the moral imperative to treat
others  with  universal  respect  and  according  to  egalitarian  reciprocity  derive?”  She
replies:
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I think the only honest and sensible response…is that indeed these norms
only make sense against the background of the hermeneutic  horizon of
modernity;  but  also  to  point  out  that  modernity,  although  the  most
significant elements constituting it were first assembled in the West, is a
world-wide  process  and  phenomenon.  From  its  very  inception,  the
dynamic of modernity has set world-historical forces into motion which
have in turn transformed it into a common human project, and not just a
Western  one.  Once  the  ideas  of  universal  equality,  liberty,  and
brotherhood—and  eventually  sisterhood—were  formulated  through  the
political revolutions of modernity, there no longer was a historical option
of going back to premodern conceptions.37 
Even in this  context of a world-historical modernity,  an African dimension of such a
modernity—the  challenge  of  nation-building,  of  evolving  viable  and  appropriate
democratic institutions; the problems of inculcating a political morality and eradicating
rampant political corruption; the problems of traditional moral standards disintegrating
vis-à-vis urbanization; and even the problems of AIDS and globalisation—requires, still
following  Benhabib’s  concession,  “the  continuing  identity  of  a  society  and  culture”
which is based upon “its capacity to deal with outside challenges and contingencies while
also retaining the belief of its member in its normative systems and value structures.”38 
We next turn to the implications of these ruminations for the constitution of a
universal humanism not partial to one imperial perspective. 
The Imperative of Resignification
The fundamental argument I have been developing hitherto is that Oyeshile’s humanist
universalism is  not  only myopic  about  the formation,  significance  and necessity  of  a
postcolonial African identity that is resistant rather than a glorification of a mystique, his
theoretical framework betrays a naïve understanding of the complex amalgam of issues
that accompany the imperial conception of such universalism. In other words, he fails to
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analyse critically the concept of the universal in its particularity and ideality; for example,
that the paradox that humanity is one and many. 
We cannot argue that since the supposed “human”, the Cartesian subject, is really
invented in the image of Euro-America—that is, this subject “is not a woman, not black,
not a migrant, not marginal,  etc”—then we should abandon the concept or its general
rhetoric as “a hopelessly contaminated concept, to be thrown out with the bathwater of
humanist  delusion.”39 This,  I  suspect,  would  be  the  fundamental  objection  of  the
universalists. But I maintain that an awareness of this delusion strengthens the concept
and guides one against any uncritical humanistic optimism, pace Oyeshile and others. It
is the humanist delusions that necessitates the imperative of resignification. 
The first point in that project is to note that before the conscription of a humanist
universalism to the processes of imperial power, conquest and empire fed by the desire
for  the  “discovery of  the  future,”  the  early  humanists—before  “humanism”—were
orientated  on  the  excitement  surrounding  the  “recovery of  the  past.”  This  implicitly
identitarian orientation was broadened by their peripatetic desires. I suppose that such
nomadic contact beyond their own provincialities enlarged their humanistic sensibilities
and  sensitivities  beyond  the  desire  to  dominate.  Their  physical  and  intellectual
peregrination led to the development of inter-generational and inter-racial collaboration
around the theme of friendship unmarred by ideological perceptions. Put in other words,
just like Machiavelli who, through the pages of the recovered ancients’ manuscripts, felt
their generosity and kindness (humanità) in responding to his modern probing, the early
humanists too were generous in their accommodation of those who do not share their
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peculiarities and cultural milieu—as long as they were humans. And this is in spite of
being partial to their own linguistic idioms.40 
In  the  early  humanists,  we  have  the  form  of  an  encompassing  humanist
universalism  that  is  multivocal;  a  coherent  vision  of  the  human  from  its
multidimensionality  or  concrete  plurality  rather  than  in  a  hollowed,  ethnocentric
singularity.41 This leads to the second point in the project of resignification. Once again,
let  us  return  to  Benhabib’s  struggle  with  “the  problem of  universalism and concrete
ethical  communities”  or  what  she calls  “the problem of  the concrete  universal.”  The
concept of concrete universality has to do with the problem of situating or concretizing
the universal. This concept, for her, recognises the distinction between the “two visions
of  universalism”:  “one  which  considers  the  other  as  a  generalized  other,  as  a  being
entitled to the same rights and duties which we would grant ourselves, and the other
which sees the human person as a ‘concrete other’ with specific histories,  needs, and
trajectories.”42  
Contrary to the essentialism of an imperial humanism, Benhabib argues that
[M]y  anti-essentialism  is  simply  introducing  this  moment  of  narrative
articulation  [in  the  sense  of  an  “account  giving”]  into  the  concept  of
culture  and  seeing  how  members  of  cultures  identify  themselves  as
members  in  creating  narratives  of  belonging.  These  narratives  of
belonging,  of  history,  of  memory,  always  have  references  to  other
narratives,  to  other  moments  of  identification.  I’m  interested  in  the
interaction between the self and other,  the “we” and the “they.” And I
think this is a universal aspect of all human communities. We are different
from those over there, on the other side, insofar as we narratively identify
ourselves with a group.43  
Such an anti-essentialist reading of culture and the universal is similar to West’s
idea  of  a  humanist  tradition  of  African-American  thought  and  behaviour.  His  basic
argument is that culture is more fundamental than politics in regard to Afro-American
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self-understanding,  “it  presupposes  that  Afro-American  cultural  perceptions  provide  a
broader  and  richer  framework  for  understanding  the  Afro-American  experience  than
political perceptions.”44 However, out of all  the traditions that provide an explanatory
matrix—the vitalist, the rationalist, the existentialist and the humanist traditions—West
favours  the  humanist  conception  of  Afro-American  history  because  it  neither
romanticises nor reject Afro-American culture (as the vitalist and the rationalist traditions
did). Rather, a humanist understanding 
accepts this culture for what it is, the expression of an oppressed human
community imposing its distinctive form of order on an existential chaos,
explaining  its  political  predicament,  preserving  its  self-respect,  and
projecting  its  own special  hope for  the  future… the  humanist  tradition
provides a cultural springboard useful in facing the ever-present issue of
self-identity for Afro-Americans and join their political struggle to other
progressive elements in American society.45 
It seems that Benhabib’s and West’s portrayal of a humanistic universalism gives
more hope for a culture’s advancement than Oyeshile’s. This is because it becomes a
concept that allows one to gaze into one’s humanity from the perspective of a cultural
past.  It  has  the fundamental  task of  enlarging  the ontological  and political  spaces  of
existence  for  the  self-definition  and self-determination  of  all  particular  cultures.  It  is
exactly this significant cultural mooring that Oyeshile denies as being unnecessary for the
understanding  of  African  development.  Without  such  a  root  or  self-image,  however,
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